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Indicators of university-industry knowledge transfer performance and their 
implications for universities: evidence from the United Kingdom 
Abstract:  
The issue of what indicators are most appropriate in order to measure the performance of 
universities in knowledge transfer (KT) activities remains relatively under-investigated. The main 
aim of this paper is to identify and discuss the limitations to the current measurements of 
university-industry KT performance, and propose some directions for improvement. We argue 
that university-industry KT can unfold in many ways and impact many stakeholders, and that, 
especially in highly differentiated university systems, choosing indicators focused on a narrow 
range of activities and impacts might limit the ability of universities to accurately represent their 
KT performance. Therefore, KT indicators should include a variety of activities and reflect a 
variety of impacts, so as to allow comparability between different institutions and avoid the 
creation of undesirable behavioural incentives. To illustrate these issues empirically, we discuss 
the case of the United Kingdom’s Higher Education –Business and Community Interaction (HE-
BCI) survey.  
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1. Introduction 
The creation and dissemination of new knowledge underpinning innovation is considered 
as a fundamental driver of economic growth (Romer, 1990). In their role as knowledge 
producers, universities are increasingly recognized to play a fundamental part in supporting 
regional and national growth. Indeed, transferring productive knowledge to the economy has 
become a “third mission” for universities, complementing the traditional research and teaching 
missions: universities are no longer ivory towers, producing knowledge in isolation, but they are 
expected to engage with a multiplicity of stakeholders in order to deliver economic benefits 
(Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000). 
Consequently, governments increasingly provide incentives to ensure that universities 
transfer knowledge to economic agents that can exploit it productively. The term knowledge 
transfer (KT) is used to identify the set of activities and processes through which universities 
accomplish their third mission objectives, although the scope of the definition can be more or 
less broad (McLellan, et al, 2006; Kelly, 2008). A particulary comprehensive definition has been 
agreed by the Research Councils and the Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills 
(DIUS) of the United Kingdom (UK): KT “encompasses the systems and processes by which 
knowledge, expertise, and skilled people transfer between the research environment (universities, 
centres and institutes) and its user communities in industry, commerce, public and service 
sectors” (RCUK, 2007, p. 5). Support for  KT activities can occurs in various ways, such as in 
the form of national project-based funding (for example in Spain; Molas-Gallart and Castro-
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Martinez, 2007) and funding for the development of a supporting infrastructure, whether at 
national level (as in Sweden; Sellenthin, 2006), or regional and State level (as in Germany and in 
the United States; Sellenthin, 2006; PACEC, 2010). In the UK, the main public funding councils 
for higher education have launched a specific “third stream” of funding (so called in order to 
distinguish it from the other funding streams for education and research) to support and 
incentivize universities’ KT activities (Molas-Gallart and Castro-Martinez, 2007; Kitagawa and 
Lightowler, 2012). The recent Witty report (2013) advocates highly targeted interventions in 
order to encourage maximum engagement from universities in the third mission agenda. 
The growing economic importance attributed to universities’ engagement in KT activities 
has led policymakers in many countries to design tools for monitoring and evaluating 
universities’ KT performance. Monitoring often occurs through systematic data collection 
exercises, whereby universities are requested to provide quantitative information that describes 
their engagement in various areas. In the United States and Canada, the Association of 
University Technology Managers (AUTM) runs a yearly survey of university technology transfer 
offices, mainly focused on technology commercialization, addressed to about 200 research 
universities. At European level, several associations of technology transfer offices such as the 
European Knowledge Transfer Association (ProTon) and the Association of European Science 
and Technology Transfer Professionals (ASTP) organize their own surveys, addressed to the 
associations’ members. In Spain the Conference of University Rectors distributes an annual 
survey to the technology transfer offices of universities and public research organizations 
(Molas-Gallart and Castro-Martinez, 2007). In the UK the Higher Education Statistics Agency 
manages a yearly survey of all universities in the country (Higher Education Business and 
Community Interaction survey, henceforth HE-BCI) collecting a large amount of information 
about their KT activities. Australia is debating the implementation of a similar exercise, 
following closely on the indicators used in the UK (Jensen et al., 2009). 
The choice of indicators for these exercises carries important implications for 
universities. Indicators are recognized to play a performative role (Davis et al., 2012; Merry, 
2011; Teixeira and Koryakina, 2013): that is, they signal what activities are considered important 
by policymakers and funding agencies, and what kind of performance may be associated to 
implicit rewards, such as better reputation and prestige. In some countries, indicators are used to 
provide an overview of universities’ strengths and weaknesses (e.g. through the construction of 
Key Performance Indicators; Chalmers, 2008) and even to allocate funding. It is therefore 
important that indicators are carefully chosen to allow universities to provide a fair and accurate 
representation of their KT activities, without introducing implicit behavioural incentives.  
However, while the analysis of university-industry KT has received a lot of attention, and 
has led to a wealth of empirical findings (Meier, 2011), there is a paucity of theoretical 
investigations into what indicators are most appropriate to measure the performance of 
universities in KT activities. In practice, most widely used KT indicators have evolved 
empirically, based on the data that have progressively become available, rather than on the basis 
of a conceptual analysis of what are the best proxies for the targeted performance criteria. The 
validity of indicators is rarely formally tested: it is usually based on literature reviews, opinions 
of experts and sometimes simply on the fact that their use has spread and consolidated over time 
(Schmitz, 1993). Once in place, indicators achieve high symbolic relevance and often end up 
being pursued for their own sake (Langford et al., 2006), especially when policy objectives are 
ambiguous (Molas-Gallart and Castro-Martinez, 2007). Not least because of their contingent and 
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a-theoretical nature, the indicators that are used in practice to assess universities’ KT 
performance suffer from numerous limitations. 
The main aim of this article is to identify and discuss the limitations to the current 
approaches to the measurement of university-industry KT performance, illustrating them with a 
case study, and to propose some directions for improvement. In section 2, we consider the 
problem of identifying appropriate KT indicators in general terms: we argue that KT activities 
can unfold in many ways and can have many impacts, and that choosing indicators focused on a 
narrow range of activities and impacts might hamper the ability of universities to accurately 
represent their KT performance. In order to allow comparability between different institutions 
and avoid the creation of undesirable behavioural incentives, KT indicators should therefore 
include a variety of activities and reflect a variety of impacts. In section 3, we illustrate this 
argument empirically by considering the case of the UK. We argue that the indicators used to 
measure and reward universities’ KT engagement are better suited to capturing the impact of 
certain types of activities than others and that, since institutions have different profiles of 
engagement in KT, this may lead some of them to be unable to correctly represent their actual 
performance. In section 4, we derive some implications for policy. It must be stressed that this 
study focuses on universities’ third mission activities, and it does not discuss the indicators used 
to measure universities’ performance in other areas such as teaching and research. 
2. The nature of knowledge transfer and its implications for the choice of 
performance  indicators 
The identification of appropriate indicators of universities’ performance is complicated 
by the complex nature of KT activities (Kingsley, et al., 1996; Bekkers and Bodas Freitas, 2008; 
Hughes et al, 2011), whose impacts are often difficult to observe and quantify (Hughes et al., 
2011). KT usually occurs through interactions rather than simple transactions, and the success of 
the process depends substantially on the interaction processes themselves (the frequency, 
characteristics and quality of the interactions), as well as on the active participation of the 
intended recipient of such transfer. It has been shown that the specific identities of the parties 
involved matter for the nature and success of KT: for knowledge to be communicated and 
received properly, the organizations involved must possess a relevant knowledge base and 
adequate absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Ternouth et al., 2012). Moreover, KT 
is not a uni-directional process in which universities simply transmit their findings to firms and 
other organizations. Rather, all the parties involved (including of course the university itself) can 
potentially learn from the interaction (Sharifi et al., 2013), (as has been acknowledged in the 
policy literature with a recent focus on bi-directional “knowledge exchange”; HEFCE, 2012), 
and KT activities generate spillovers that benefit agents beyond those involved in the initial 
transfer. Hence, the impact of KT often goes beyond the immediate outputs produced by such 
activities and the set of their intended recipients, and its value can not easily be captured in 
economic terms. 
Choosing appropriate indicators in order to measure universities’ KT performance is 
therefore a complex task that must recognize the variety of KT activities performed, the 
specificity of each of these activities, the difficulties inherent in identifying what “counts” as 
impact (Watermeyer, 2012) and in fully capturing it through simple measures of output and 
economic value (Molas-Gallart et al., 2002; Kelly, 2008). Based on these considerations, we 
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outline several dimensions that should be taken into account when attempting to measure 
universities’ KT performance in a fair and accurate way. 
Variety of KT activities. The range of KT activities considered must be broad enough to reflect 
the variety of activities undertaken by universities: if the choice of activities to be measured is 
not sufficiently comprehensive, the indicators may misrepresent the performance of universities 
that engage in activities that are not measured. As an example, evidence shows that universities 
engage in a plurality of interactions with economic and community stakeholders, only a few of 
which are based on the sale and licensing of patents and the industrial exploitation of academic 
research outcomes (Bekkers and Bodas Freitas, 2008). Since the universities that specialize in 
the arts and humanities rarely produce patentable research outputs, relying upon indicators 
heavily focused on the filing of patents and the execution of licenses could prevent these 
universities from correctly representing the KT activities they engage in. 
Variety of impacts. Focusing only on indicators directed at measuring the outputs of KT 
activities may penalize universities that transfer knowledge whose social and economic impact is 
not accurately reflected by the diffusion of measurable outputs. For example, while the number 
of consultancy contracts a university stipulates provides some measure of academics’ 
engagement in KT, it does not provide information about the benefits that such activities 
generate for the receiving organizations. A particularly problematic indicator is the income that 
universities receive from their KT activities. Income is assumed to reflect the value that external 
partners place on the knowledge they receive from universities, and hence to provide a proxy of 
the value created through KT. However, this assumption is questionable, and several arguments 
support the view that the income a university receives for KT does not necessarily reflect the 
impact of its activities:  
 more prestigious institutions may be able to charge more for their services because of 
reputation, not because of the value of the transferred knowledge is greater (on the 
economic returns on reputation, see Fombrun 1995; Roberts and Dawling, 2002);  
 the cost of KT activities varies widely, and higher income may simply reflect the higher 
cost of providing a certain service. For example, the cost of KT activities in the social 
sciences and humanities is often lower than in areas like medicine and engineering where 
expensive equipment or complex clinical studies may be required; 
 some forms of knowledge are transferred at a very low price because they are aimed at 
beneficiaries with limited income (such as services to the community) but their value can 
be high from a social viewpoint (Hatakenaka, 2005);  
 in order to achieve greater impact, universities may choose to disseminate knowledge for 
free under open source licenses or other open mechanisms (Sorensen and Chambers, 
2008); 
 some KT activities may generate, similarly to basic research activities (Nelson, 1959; 
Mowery,1983), broad benefits for society and large externalities that may not be captured 
easily by specific individuals or organizations, who therefore would be less willing to pay 
for them, even though these activities may have large impact (for example, activities 
involving the creation of social and community links, the enhancement of cultural and 
social capital, the upskilling of the local and national labour force). Some KT activities 
may be highly uncertain, especially if they involve a research component, so that at the 
start of the project the participants may be unaware of what benefits will be accrued and 
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when: therefore they would be willing to pay a price that only partially reflects the value 
of the benefits that they will eventually capture. 
Comparability between institutions. Indicators may be strongly affected by factors related to 
institutional characteristics such as size and subject mix. For example, reliance on indicators 
based on the absolute amount of KT activities performed, rather than on measures of engagement 
in KT per unit of staff, could disadvantage smaller universities. The choice of indicators should 
allow comparability among different institutions, so that different outcomes can be ascribed to 
genuine performance differentials rather than to institutional characteristics. 
Behavioural incentives. The system should be structured in such a way as to avoid the creation of 
undesirable behavioural incentives. If the chosen indicators specifically reward only certain KT 
activities, and not others, this creates implicit incentives for universities to engage only in the 
activities that are rewarded; but these activities may not necessarily be the most effective ways to 
transfer knowledge for all universities. For example, if the choice of indicators rewards 
universities that transfer knowledge through the sale of patents and licenses, this would 
incentivise universities to apply for more patents, even when this is not beneficial (Lambert, 
2003). The problem of behavioural incentives is very broad, and links to another important issue: 
the interaction between KT and teaching and research activities. It is well known that while KT 
can productively complement and enhance teaching and research (Abreu et al, 2008), 
occasionally it can also give rise to conflicting incentives (Lambert, 2003). Indicators of KT 
performance should therefore take care to avoid incentivizing academics to undertake behaviours 
(such as excessive patenting and secrecy or allowing excessive influence of industrial sponsors 
on research design and the selection of research results), which in the long run may undermine 
scientific credibility and reduce the possibility for others to perform research. 
Since there are major differences among countries in terms of how KT between 
university and industry is measured, in the next section we focus on the case of the UK to 
illustrate how the indicators fare with respect to these dimensions, and what are the implications 
for the universities’ ability to adequately represent their KT performance. This case is interesting 
for several reasons. As the UK is one of the first countries to have launched a comprehensive 
data collection exercise on universities’ KT activities (the HE-BCI survey), its choice of 
indicators is likely to provide a benchmark for policymakers in other countries. Therefore, 
understanding their drawbacks and implications is relevant beyond the country’s borders. Since 
the HE-BCI survey is very comprehensive when compared to other systematic data collection 
exercises on universities’ KT activities1, any limitations identified with respect to this survey 
apply even more strongly to similar exercises implemented in other countries. The availability of 
secondary data that are comparable across different institutions and over time allows us to 
support some of our arguments with quantitative evidence.  
 
                                                     
1
 Rosli and Rossi (2014) present a comparison among the surveys implemented in the UK, USA and Canada, 
Australia and Europe. 
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3. Case study: the HE-BCI survey in the United Kingdom and third stream funding 
allocation in England (HEIF) 
In the late 1990s, the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) began to 
run a systematic survey (HE-BCI) aimed at capturing the intensity and characteristics of the 
exchange of knowledge between higher education institutions, the business community and 
society at large (HEFCE, 2012). The most recent editions of the survey consist of two parts: Part 
A for data on universities’ KT strategies, policies and infrastructures, and Part B for financial 
and other quantitative data measuring engagement in and impact of KT, in a specific year.2
 
 
The HE-BCI survey is addressed to all universities in the UK. The information collected 
through this survey is used to support evidence-based policymaking (HESA, 2012) and to 
determine the allocation of third stream funding: the Higher Education Innovation Fund (HEIF) 
in England, the Innovation and Engagement Fund in Wales, the Knowledge Transfer grant in 
Scotland and the Higher Education Innovation Fund (HEIF) in Northern Ireland. While, over 
time, all of these funds have moved from competitive to formula-based allocation, the English 
HEIF is the only one that, following the recommendation of the Sainsbury Review (2007) is 
currently allocated 100% through a formula
3
. Since 2012, all third stream funding in England is 
distributed pro-rata to universities according to their share of overall KT income, based on the 
information presented in Part B of the survey. To compute the institution’s income from KT, the 
incomes derived from each activity considered in part B are summed over (each activity is 
weighted equally, although any income obtained from SMEs is assigned double weight). Then, 
funds from HEIF are assigned to each institution proportionally to that institution’s share of 
overall KT income, as long as the institution reaches a minimum threshold income of £250,000. 
The actual allocation depends on the HEIF’s annual budget.  
In the following section 3.1, we analyze the indicators included in the HE-BCI survey, 
arguing that the focus on a limited variety of KT activities and impacts reduces the comparability 
between institutions and leads to the creation of possibly undesirable behavioural incentives. 
Then, in section 3.2, we analyse how the system of reward of universities’ KT performance, 
entirely based on the KT income that universities accrue, reinforces these patterns. The analysis 
is based on the indicators contained in the most recent (2010/11) edition of the HE-BCI survey, 
on data from the same edition of the survey and data on the HEIF funding allocations received 
by 131 English universities
4
 in 2013.  
3.1. The HE-BCI survey: a critique of the chosen indicators 
Table 1 summarises the areas and indicators measured in Part B of the HE-BCI survey
5
. 
Each of Part B’s five sections, listed in the first column, includes several key dimensions or sub-
areas (listed in the second column). Several indicators are used in order to measure performance 
in each sub-area (listed in the third column).  
                                                     
2
 Since 2009, the survey has been collected and validated by the Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA). 
3
 The shares of funds allocated through formula are 80% in Northern Ireland, 75% in Wales and 92% in Scotland. 
4
 Since we use data from HEIF funding allocations in order to support our arguments, we must restrict our 
comparative analysis to those institutions that receive funding based on the same formula. We have decided to focus 
on universities in England, whose third mission funding is distributed 100% through formula allocation, and which 
constitute the larges share (81%) of UK universities.  
5
 Since only the quantitative information contained in Part B is used as a basis to compare and reward universities’ 
performance, we do not analyze in detail the more qualitative information collected in Part A. 
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Table 1: Activities and indicators included in part B the HE-BCI survey 
Sections Sub-areas Indicators   
Research 
related 
activities 
Collaborative research 
with public funding
 (i)
  
Income, in–kind (ii) contribution 

Contract research 
(iii)
 Income, total value, number of contracts (by: SME
 (iv)
 , Non 
SME commercial, non-commercial) 
Business and 
Community 
service 
Consultancy contracts Income, total value, number of contracts (by: SME , Non SME 
commercial, non-commercial) 
Courses for business 
and the community 
(CPD and CE)
(v)
 
Revenue, total learner days delivered
(vi)
 (by: SME , Non SME 
commercial, non-commercial, individual) 
Facilities and 
equipment related 
services 
Income, total value, total number of services (by: SME , Non 
SME commercial, non-commercial, individual) 
Regeneration 
and 
development 
programs 

Regeneration and 
development programs 

Income from European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), 
European Social Foundation (ESF), UK Government 
regeneration funds, Regional Development Agency (RDA) 
programme, Others Income 
Intellectual 
Property (IP) 
Disclosures and 
patents filed by or on 
behalf of the HEI 
Number of new patent applications filed in year 
Number of patents granted in year 
Cumulative patent portfolio
(vii)
 
Licence numbers Number  of licenses for non-software and software (by: SME, 
non-SME commercial and non-commercial) 
IP Income Partner type: SMEs, Other (non-commercial) businesses and 
other non-commercial organisations). 
IP revenues, Total cost 
Spin-off activity Spin-offs
(viii)
, staff start-up
(ix)
 graduate start-up
(x)
 
HEI owned, non-HEI owned. 
Number of active firms, estimates employment, turnover, 
investment received 
Social, 
community 
and cultural 
engagement 
Public lectures, 
Performance arts, 
Exhibitions, Museum 
education, Other 
Number of Attendees (free events, chargeable events), staff 
time 
Note to table: 
(i) Public funding: UK Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) research councils, royal society and British Academy, other UK 
government departments, EU government, and others. 
(ii) In-kind: contributions to the project from the non-academic collaborators. 
(iii) Non-public funding and research councils. 
(iv) Employ fewer than 250 employees worldwide (including partners and executive directors), and has either an annual turnover not exceeding 
50m Euros (approximately 42m British Pound), or an annual balance sheet total not exceeding 43m Euros (approximately 36m British Pound), 
and conforms to the following independence criteria: no more of 25% of the capital or the voting rights is owned by an enterprise falling outside 
the definition of an SME (HEFCE, 2011). 
(v) Excluding pre-registration funded by the National Health Service (NHS) or Training and Development Agency (TDA). 
(vi) One day is equivalent to one person receiving eight hours of teaching/training. 
(vii) Active (registered under licence to an external party) and live patents. 
(viii) Spin-offs are defined as companies set-up to exploit IP that has originated from within the HEI. 
(ix) Staff start up are defined as those companies set-up by active (or recent) HEI staff but not based on IP from the institution. 
(x) Graduate start-ups include all new business started by recent graduates (within two years) regardless of where any IP resides. 
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Table 1 suggests that the variety of KT activities that are monitored through the survey is 
extensive but not exhaustive. Although the survey tries to capture a full range of KT activities, 
not all of them are investigated with the same degree of detail and some are overlooked.  
The measurement of KT via intellectual property rights and spin offs is attributed high 
importance, as it includes 4 out of the 10 sub-areas measured in part B of the survey, and nearly 
36% of the questions included in the survey. This is despite evidence that shows that only few 
universities use this model with appreciable intensity and success (Litan et al. 2008), as it 
suitable to a limited number of scientific fields (Harabi 1995; Brouwer and  Kleinknecht 1999). 
Moreover, the focus is strongly on patents and copyright licenses: little attention is paid to other 
intellectual property rights (design rights, trademarks) and to many non-proprietary types of 
intellectual property that universities produce (materials and artefacts not protected by 
intellectual property rights, or protected by open source or creative common licenses) (Andersen 
et al., 2012; Baghurst and Pollard, 2009). As some types of disciplines (the arts and humanities, 
for example) are likely to generate the latter forms of intellectual property rather than patents, 
institutions that are relatively more focused on these disciplines may be unable to correctly 
represent the amount of KT they engage in. 
 Some attention is paid to forms of KT that involve open dissemination: publicly-funded 
collaborative research with non-academic partners, publicly-funded regeneration programmes 
and knowledge-dissemination activities in the humanities and social sciences. However, these 
activities are quite marginal: together, they represent only around 12% of the questions included 
in the survey. The impact of publicly-funded programmes is mainly measured on the basis of the 
funding they attracted, neglecting other outputs (collaborative research can produce joint 
university-industry publications, support joint workshops and other openly disseminated outputs, 
and regeneration programmes can have many valuable impacts on the community).  
While the survey collects information about some interactions with industry and the local 
business environment and community, several important types are not included, especially those 
involving students and personal interactions (graduate placements in industry, recruitment of 
university staff members to industry positions, academics’ participation in industry conferences 
and workshops, placements of entrepreneurs and industry personnel in universities, visiting 
scholarships, and others; overviews of the many channels of knowledge exchange are presented 
in Dutrénit et al., 2010; Hughes et al., 2011; Boardman and Ponomariov, 2009; Jensen, R. et al, 
2010; Bekkers and Bodas Freitas, 2008). Furthermore, interactions around production and 
service activities, such as prototyping, clinical testing and design services, would fall within the 
very generic area of “Facilities and equipment related services” where they would be grouped 
with standardized, non-knowledge producing services like room and equipment rental activities.  
The implications of using indicators not reflecting the full variety of KT activities 
performed by universities are particularly relevant in highly differentiated university systems, 
where different institutions specialize in different types of KT activities. This is the case for the 
131 universities in England. The HE-BCI data from 2010/11 show that different English 
universities have different objectives when they engage in KT, and focus relatively more on 
areas of KT that are consistent with their objectives. The universities participating in the survey 
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were asked to state their main objectives, choosing three out of 13 possible options.
6
 By applying 
a hierarchical clustering algorithm
7
 to these 13 variables, we have identified 6 distinct clusters of 
universities according to their key objectives. Universities in the first three groups (clusters 1, 2 
and 3) have a national or global focus, although with different emphasis; the rest of the 
universities have predominantly a local focus. To simplify the analysis, we have further 
agregated the three smaller clusters with “local” objectives into a single cluster comprising 25 
institutions
8
 (cluster 4). Table 2 summarises these clusters. 
 
Table 2. Clustering universities according to their knowledge transfer objectives 
 
Cluster: focus Main knowledge transfer objectives 
N. 
universities 
% 
universities 
1. Research and TT 
Supporting business via research and 
technology transfer 
42 32.06% 
2. Education  
Widening access to education and meeting 
nation's demand for skills 
27 20.61% 
3. General  Support for SMEs, education and research 37 28.24% 
4. Local  
Focus on SMEs and local employment; focus 
on attracting students and building community 
links; focus on local partnerships and regional 
skills 
25 19.09% 
  
Figure 1 shows the KT engagement profiles of universities in the different clusters. We 
consider all the activities for which data on the intensity of engagement is collected (number of 
research contracts, number of consultancy contracts; number of facilities and equipment-related 
services; learner days of CPD courses provided; number of disclosures; number of licenses; 
number of spinoffs; academic staff days of public events performed). Each indicator is then 
divided by the number of academic staff employed by the institution, and normalized to lie 
between zero and 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
6
 The 13 options are: Access to education, Graduate retention in local region, Technology transfer, Supporting small 
and medium size enterprises (SMEs) Attracting inward investment to region, Research collaboration with industry, 
Attracting non-local students to the region,  Support for community development, Developing local partnerships, 
Management development, Meeting regional skills needs, Meeting national skills needs, Spin-off activity. 
7
 We have used an agglomerative complete-linkage clustering procedure, according to which units are progressively 
grouped into clusters based on a measure of distance. One of the advantages of hierarchical clustering is that the 
number of clusters can be appropriately selected upon inspection of the dendrogram produced by the clustering 
algorithm, rather than having to be specified a priori. 
8
 According to a Kruskal-Wallis rank test, 8 out of the 13 variables used to construct the clusters have statistically 
significant means differences across the four clusters. 
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Figure 1. Knowledge transfer engagement profiles of universities in different clusters 
  
 
The diagram shows that universities in different clusters have different profiles of 
engagement, in line with their strategic objectives. Staff at universities in the “Research and TT” 
cluster are relatively more engaged in intellectual-property related activities (disclosures, 
licenses, spinoff companies). Staff at universities in the “Local” and “Education” clusters are 
relatively more engaged in consultancies, public events, CPD courses and facilities and 
equipment-related services, as their missions bring them to engage more directly with their 
stakeholders using a variety of interactions. The “Education” cluster appears to have a more 
diversified engagement profile than the other clusters. Hence, it is likely that the indicators 
included in the HE-BCI survey are more suitable to the KT profiles of certain universities than 
others. In particular, since the survey focuses heavily on intellectual property-related indicators 
(especially focusing on patent and copyright licenses), and instead overlooks several KT 
activities involving students and personal interactions between university and industry staff, 
those universities that are education-oriented and those that are particularly keen to support 
employability and local firms may be especially unable to accurately reflect the activities they 
engage in. 
From the point of view of the variety of impacts considered, Table 1 suggests that the 
choice of indicators is strongly oriented towards quantifying the outputs of KT activities, 
especially the income received from them. The characteristics and quality of the interactions 
through which KT takes place (for example their duration, the number of partner organizations 
and people involved, the partners’ satisfaction with the interactions, their perception of what they 
learned from the interactions and the short and long term benefits they received) are not 
considered. The only indicators that capture some interaction aspects measure the number of 
contracts issued and the partners’ types (SMEs/large firms/ non commercial organizations) and 
location (within the same region/outside the region).  
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Also, although it was claimed that the dataset provides valuable and in depth commentary 
on the extent of knowledge exchange in the UK, the indicators only capture uni-directional KT 
from the HEIs, and no attempts are made to explore the benefits that universities derive from 
these activities, besides income. 
The focus on a limited variety of KT activities and impacts creates problems of 
comparability and generates potentially undesirable behavioural incentives. Universities that 
perform activities that are not measured in the survey, or whose outputs are not correctly 
reflected in the income they generate, are unable to correctly represent their engagement in KT. 
Over time, this may encourage them to move away from KT activities whose performance is not 
properly acknowledged, and towards activities that instead are more accurately measured, even 
though this may not actually translate into greater KT engagement, nor generate greater benefits 
for the stakeholders that these universities interact with.  
The system of monetary reward of universities’ KT performance, based on the allocation 
of third stream funding through a formula entirely dependent on the income that universities 
accrue from KT activities, is likely to reinforce these patterns. Using data from the HE-BCI 
2010-11, in the rest of our analysis we focus on the limitations of income as an indicator of 
performance, and on the consequences of a system of performance reward entirely based on 
income measurement. We argue not only that income in itself is not an accurate proxy for 
impact, but also that the level of income accrued can depend upon a number of institutional 
characteristics – a university’s KT profile, its subject mix, its size – which can confound the 
measurement of performance. 
3.2. The limitations of income as an indicator of knowledge transfer performance 
According to HEFCE (2011), the choice to assign HEIF funding on the basis of the level 
of KT income accrued by each institution reflected the objective to “incentivise and support 
those HEIs that can make the greatest contribution to the economy and society”, since “income 
remains the best proxy we have for the impact of KE activities on the economy and society; 
hence it is the best measure of performance and will be used in the formula allocation of HEIF” 
(HEFCE, 2011). This argument, however, suffers from two weaknesses.  
First, as we argued previously, the income a university receives for KT does not 
necessarily reflect the impact of its activities. As we illustrated in the previous section, some 
activities may not be accurately measured in data collection exercises, and their income may not 
be considered. Even when activities are included, for some of them income may not be a 
meaningful indicator: for example, the HE-BCI survey captures the universities’ engagement in 
public lectures, performance arts, exhibitions and museum education, but does not attempt to 
measure the income generated through these activities as many are offered for free. Moreover, 
there are many reasons why a low-income activity can have large impact (presence of 
externalities, uncertainty, nature of the intended beneficiaries), and conversely sometimes high 
income simply reflects high costs or a premium gained for reputation. In highly differentiated 
university systems, where universities perform different KT activities and interact with different 
stakeholders, their ability to produce income depends not just on their actual engagement in KT 
but also, given a similar degree of engagement (and possibly impact), on the nature of the KT 
activities they perform.  
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Secondly, the level of income can be high simply because the institution employs a large 
number of academic and KT staff: this implies rewarding an institution because of the scale of its 
operations, rather than for the effectiveness with which it uses its resources to generate KT 
impacts (rewarding “capacity rather than excellence” as the University Alliance, (2011), put it in 
response to a HEFCE consultation), which is not, per se, a way to reward performance. 
We present some empirical evidence in support of these two arguments. The first 
argument is that the amount of income that a university receives from KT in part depends on the 
nature of the activities it engages in, and does not necessarily reflect the intensity of its 
engagement in KT or its impact. We find strong correlations between the universities’ KT 
profiles and the third stream funding that they received, which is based on their income from KT. 
Universities in the “Education” and “Local” clusters comprise, together, 40% of the population, 
but make up 63% of the group of universities that have received zero funding from HEIF, and 
only 13% of the group that has received more than £2m. Universities in the “Research and TT” 
clusters are, by contrast, 32% of the population, but only 7% of the group that has received zero 
HEIF funding and 73% of the group that has received more than £2m. The mean funding 
obtained by universities in the “Research and TT” cluster (£1,974,043) is much higher than that 
obtained by universities in all the other clusters (£829,811 in the “General” one, £743,885 in the 
“Education” one and £775,880 in the “Local” one), and the differences are all statistically 
significant. At the same time, as shown in Figure 1, universities in the “Research and TT” cluster 
do not always perform more KT activities per academic staff than other universities: indeed, 
universities in the “Education” and “Local” clusters tend to do more research contracts, 
consultancies, facilities and equipment-related services and CPDs per unit of staff: this suggests 
that these universites receive less income not because they engage in a lower amount of KT 
activities per capita, but because they tend to focus on less remunerative KT activities.  
Another way to see how the income that universities receive from KT depends on the 
nature of KT activities they engage in, is to consider the universities’ subject mix. We can expect 
universities with greater incidence of staff in the arts and humanities to engage in KT activities 
whose impacts are less likely to be accurately reflected in the income produced, because their 
target clients are more often disadvantaged socioeconomic groups, or the broader community; 
furthermore, these activities are generally less costly (compared to, for example, clinical trials 
and prototyping). Indeed, if we correlate the the institutions’ HEIF funding allocations with the 
share of staff employed in each discipline in 2010/11 (considering nine main categories)
9
 we find 
that the correlations between funding allocation and share of staff in most of the sciences are 
mainly significantly positive, while the correlations between funding allocation and share of staff 
in some of the arts and humanities and in education are significantly negative. This is shown in 
Table 3, which reports a positive sign for each significantly positive correlation and negative 
sign for each significantly negative correlation. From the same table we can also see the 
correlations between the shares of academic staff in each subject and various measures of KT 
engagement per academic staff. We find that these correlations are varied, with both the sciences 
and the humanities displaying positive correlations with some types of engagement and negative 
correlations with others. Therefore, the higher income received by the universities that have 
greater share of staff in the sciences is not necessarily due to greater engagement in all kinds of 
KT activities, but probably to greater engagement in more remunerative ones. For example, the 
share of staff in Design, Creative & Performing Arts is negatively correlated to HEIF funding 
                                                     
9
 These data referred to staff full-person equivalent (excluding atypical) by cost centre, 2010/11. Source: HESA. 
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received but it is positively correlated with the number of consultancies per staff and the number 
of CPDs per academic staff, suggesting that the lower income accruing to these subjects is not 
necessarity due to lower engagement but to the lower prices that these activities command. The 
share of staff in Business & Administrative Sciences is positively correlated to the number of 
disclosures per academic staff, but uncorrelated to the number of patent and copyright licenses 
per academic staff (maybe because licensing occurs though other mechanisms such as open 
source contracts, or because the related knowledge is not licensed but openly disseminated), and 
to HEIF funding. 
 
Table 3. Signs of significant correlations between the share of staff in each discipline and: 
amount of HEIF allocation, various measures of knowledge transfer engagement per academic 
staff  
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Medicine, dentistry & 
health 
+   - -  + +  
Agriculture, forestry 
& veterinary science 
 + + + +     
Biological, 
mathematical & 
physical sciences 
+   - -  +   
Engineering & 
technology 
+   - -  + +  
Architecture & 
planning 
         
Administrative, 
business & social 
studies 
 -  -  -  +  
Humanities & 
language based 
studies & archaeology 
         
Design, creative & 
performing arts 
-  +  +  -   
Education -      - -  
 
 
The second argument that we presented is that it may be misleading to use the level of 
KT income as a basis to assess performance because this variable often depends on the size of 
the institution. In fact, we find a strong positive correlation between the size of the institution (in 
terms of both the number of academic staff and the number of Business and Community 
engagement staff) and the amount of HEIF funding received, as shown in Table 4. So there is 
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some support for the argument that one of the reasons explaining universities’ greater income is 
their larger size in terms of academic and Business and Community engagement staff
10
. 
Table 4. Average sizes of universities according to HEIF funding received 
  
Academic staff  
2010-11 
Business & Community 
engagement staff   
2010-11 
zero  
115.8 12.16 
<500,000£ 
226.8667 16.4 
500,000£ - 1ML 
534.8636 37.96818 
1ML - 2ML 
695.125 58.02813 
2ML - 2,850,000£ 
690.5714 91.57143 
maximum funding (2,850,000£) 
1095.261 114.013 
correlation between amount of 
HEIF allocation and size 
0.7521*** 0.5676*** 
 
 
To capture the effectiveness of a university’s KT performance, it would be more 
appropriate to use an indicator of income normalized by the amount of resources used to produce 
it. The following Figure 2 shows how the ranking of the different clusters would change if 
performance in different types of KT activities was measured in terms of income per academic 
staff or income per contract, rather than of total income. The “Research and TT” cluster is ranked 
first for all types of KT activities when using total income (on average, universities in this cluster 
are significantly larger than those in the “Education” and “Local” clusters), but falls behind in 
some of them when income per academic staff or income per contract are used. The “Education” 
cluster is ranked first for consultancies when income per contract is used, and first for 
consultancies, CPDs and facility and equiprment-related services when income per academic 
staff is used. The “General” cluster is ranked first for CPDs when income per contract is used. 
This suggests that the current approach based on considering the level of total income is not 
always rewarding the most effective performers, but often the larger institutions.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
10
 In this paper, we do not deal with the issue of whether it makes sense to reward the KT activities of universities 
that perform them on a larger scale. There could be arguments in favour of this, for example if there were significant 
economies of scale (that is, if larger institutions were more productive), or if there was evidence that the KT 
activities performed by larger institutions had somehow greater impact. However, while there is some evidence that 
the impact of research activities increases more than proportionally with institutional size (Katz, 2000), at present 
we know very little about how the amount and impact of KT activities in a broader sense scale with institutional 
size. 
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Figure 2. Sensitivity of performance ranking to different types of indicators 
 
 
  
In order to capture the extent to which institutional KT profiles and characteristics (including 
subject mix and size) together might impact the universities’ ability to generate KT income, we 
run a regression analysis on the 131 universities. Our dependent variable is the HEIF funding 
allocation for 2013 (in natural logarithms). The independent variables, whose main descriptive 
statistics are reported in Table 5, capture some of the main institutional characteristics (size in 
terms of number of academic staff and of staff employed in Business and Community 
engagement functions; age of the university; shares of staff in different disciplines), some 
aspects of the institution’s mission (composition of the governing body) and KT profiles 
(whether the university belongs to one of the four clusters identified). The variables also capture 
what sectors are targeted in KT activities and the nature of the KT by the university, whether it is 
characterized by large externalities – proxied by the share of income accruing from more “open 
ended” and risky activities, i.e. collaborative research and regeneration programmes –  or 
whether it is more appropriable in nature –  proxied by the share of income accruing from 
activities leading to results that are more company-tailored, and therefore more appropriable, 
such as contract research, consultancy, facilities and equipment-related services. We control for 
the institution’s region. All the independent variables refer to 2010/11.  
 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the regression 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Heif allocation 2013 129 10.752 5.975 0.000 14.863 
Academic staff FTE 131 542.046 441.156 0.000 1867.000 
Business & Community engagement staff 131 50.201 61.547 0.000 337.000 
Age 131 126.657 106.883 6.000 917.000 
% academic staff in science and medicine 131 0.313 0.248 0.000 1.000 
% academic staff in technology 131 0.109 0.113 0.000 0.690 
% academic staff in humanities 131 0.382 0.298 0.000 1.000 
Governing body: % business 131 0.393 0.141 0.080 0.824 
Governing body: % social, community and 
cultural 
131 0.129 0.117 0.000 0.789 
Governing body: % public sector 131 0.306 0.178 0.000 0.750 
Research & TT 131 0.321 0.469 0.000 1.000 
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Research and TT General Education Local 
Income per academic staff 
Income per contract 
Total income 
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Education 131 0.206 0.406 0.000 1.000 
Local 131 0.191 0.394 0.000 1.000 
Agriculture and mining 131 0.504 0.502 0.000 1.000 
Manufacturing 131 0.740 0.440 0.000 1.000 
Utilities 131 0.634 0.484 0.000 1.000 
KIBS 131 0.878 0.329 0.000 1.000 
Other services 131 0.870 0.337 0.000 1.000 
Public sector 131 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
% income from collaborative research and 
regeneration programmes 
131 0.275 0.214 0.000 1.000 
% income from contract research, 
consultancies and facilities & equipment 
services 
131 0.398 0.241 0.000 0.970 
 
 
The next table presents the regression results. Due to the nature of the dependent variable we 
estimate a tobit model with right censoring
11
. Model 1 reports the results of the tobit regression 
while Model 2 reports the results of a tobit instrumental variable (ivtobit) regression in which all 
the independent and control variables are the same, but the number of Business and Community 
engagement staff has been instrumented by the number of Business and Community engagement 
staff in 2005/06, to take care of possible endogeneity (if the higher income from KT allows 
universities to employ a higher number of Business and Community engagement staff). The 
number of observations in the regression is 129 because two English universities are not 
included in the 2013 HEIF funding allocation list (the Universtiy of Buckingham and the School 
of Pharmacy). The instrumental variable regression has only 122 observations due to missing 
values in the instrument. 
 
Table 6. Regression results 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
Academic staff FTE 0.007*** 0.008** 
 (0.002) (0.003) 
Business & Community engagement staff 0.041** 0.035 
 (0.016) (0.029) 
Age -0.003 -0.005 
 (0.008) (0.008) 
% academic staff in science and medicine -2.095 -3.308 
 (4.452) (4.265) 
% academic staff in technology -1.190 -1.074 
 (6.328) (6.031) 
% academic staff in arts and humanities -7.565* -6.657* 
 (4.194) (4.006) 
Governing body: % business -3.421 -7.183 
 (4.430) (4.596) 
Governing body: % social, community and cultural -1.857 -4.414 
 
(4.885) (4.957) 
Governing body: % public sector 4.414 3.425 
                                                     
11
 We obtain similar results if we use as a dependent variable either (i) a variable with six categories representing 
different levels of HEIF funding (0 = zero, 1 =  <500,000£, 2 = 500,000£ - 1ML, 3 = 1ML - 2ML, 4 = 2ML - 
2,850,000£, 5 = maximum funding (2,850,000£)) or  (ii) the logarithm of the institution’s eligible income for HEIF 
purposes. In case (i) we have estimated an ordered probit, in case (ii) we have estimated an OLS regression. 
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(3.193) (3.179) 
Research & TT 0.731 1.019 
 (1.513) (1.633) 
Education -3.303** -2.573 
 (1.613) (1.599) 
Local -0.596 -0.686 
 (1.502) (1.506) 
Agriculture and mining -0.051 0.134 
 (1.270) (1.328) 
Manufacturing 5.635*** 4.310** 
 
(1.853) (1.779) 
Utilities 3.623** 2.780* 
 (1.529) (1.476) 
KIBS -8.555*** -6.543** 
 (2.615) (2.568) 
Other services 3.246 3.160 
 
(2.133) (2.033) 
% income from collaborative research and 
regeneration programmes 
3.101 4.075 
 (2.971) (3.150) 
% income from contract research, consultancies and 
facilities & equipment services 
7.087** 7.109** 
 (2.764) (2.990) 
Constant 1.448 3.802 
 (5.819) (5.624) 
Regional variables significant significant 
   
Observations 129 122 
LR Chi 2 155.67 135.38 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 
Wald test of exogeneity: Chi2  
0.10  
 
Wald test of exogeneity: Prob>Chi2   0.7573 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 The results confirm that the amount of HEIF allocation received by an institution, which 
depends on the income accrued from a range of KT activities, is strongly correlated with the size 
of the institution, and negatively correlated with the share of academic staff in the arts and 
humanities. The amount of Business and Community engagement staff becomes insignificant 
once it is instrumented (however the Wald test cannot reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity, 
suggesting that the instrumental variable approach is not necessary; while consistent, the ivtobit 
estimates may have larger standard errors). The KT profile of the university institution also 
matters, with institutions engaging with the manufacturing sector receiving higher funds. Instead, 
institutions that engage with knowledge-intensive business services (KIBS) and institutions in 
the ”Education” cluster receive lower funds. We find that the share of income accruing from 
activities leading to more appropriable outcomes is strongly linked to HEIF funding. Regional 
variables are also significant, with location in London and the South East positively related to 
HEIF funding.  
These results are in line with our earlier argument that some types of KT activities are 
more expensive than others and that the willingness to pay of different types of beneficiaries is 
different, so that universities that are more focused on the humanities and that interact more with 
the service sector command lower income than universities that interact more with the 
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manufacturing sector and that engage in projects with more appropriable outcomes, even though 
the former may be equally engaged in KT as the latter. Indeed, Hatakenaka (2005) highlighted 
that the volume of external income received by universities may reflect “the kind of clients the 
university serves rather than the intensity of demand or the success of the university” (p.15). The 
results also conform with the study by Teixeira and Koryakina (2013) who show that sector and 
institutional characteristics are important in generating funding.  
4. Conclusion: going beyond current indicators 
We have argued that university KT activities can unfold in many ways and can generate a 
variety of impacts, and that choosing indicators focused on a narrow range of activities and 
impacts might limit the ability of universities to accurately represent their KT performance, 
especially in highly differentiated university systems where universities have different profiles of 
KT engagement. We have illustrated this with reference to the case of the UK.  We have debated 
that the choice of indicators in the HE-BCI survey, while wider than in other surveys, is still not 
sufficiently broad in terms of the types of activities and types of impact considered. As a 
consequence, this raises issues of comparability between institutions, and potentially introduces 
undesirable behavioural incentives whereby universities may be encouraged to increase their 
involvement in KT activities where engagement and impact are measured appropriately, to the 
detriment of other KT activities which are not measured as well but which may be equally 
important. For example universities may be induced to shift their engagement towards research 
commercialisation activities, which are measured comprehensively, and away from activities 
involving student and staff placements in industry, which are not. This may reduce variety and 
possibly negatively affect the amount and quality of KT taking place. 
These problems are reinforced by the adoption of criteria for funding allocation that 
reward the universities that accrue the highest levels of income. We have shown that English 
universities’ ability to accrue KT income is strongly influenced by their size, subject mix, KT 
profile (particularly in terms of the sectors they interact with) and the nature of the knowledge 
transferred (more or less appropriable). This implies that universities may accrue larger income 
because they are larger (although not necessarily more effective, if the resources they employ in 
KT are not more productive than those employed in smaller institutions) and engage in KT 
activities that are more remunerative (although not necessarily producing greater impacts). It 
must also be pointed out that when funding is entirely distributed on the basis of a formula, it is 
paramount that the data used to compute it are highly accurate and reliable. Some doubts have 
been raised about the HE-BCI data in this respect (Rae et al., 2012). 
What are possible avenues for improvement? It would be appropriate to consider more 
composite ways to measure KT performance, including a broader range of activities and more 
varied ways to measure impact besides the income generated. Some of the indicators included 
should be directed at capturing qualitative aspects of KT, and the feedback effects of KT 
activities on universities. In order to choose indicators that are not biased in favour of institutions 
that adopt specific KT profiles, a possible approach could be to recognize that institutions are 
different and may require different sets of indicators, for example by developing a very broad 
range of indicators representing all possible activities, and allowing universities to choose the 
indicators that best fit their KT profile (adopting a flexible approach to measurement as 
suggested, in the more general case of innovation policy indicators, by Rafols et al., 2012). 
Alternatively, the information from KT surveys like the HE-BCI may be utilised to a greater 
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extent by government agencies to identify initial profiles of universities, and act as an initial step 
in profiling KT engagement.  
Once we move away from indicators based on income only, aggregating indicators in 
order to obtain aggregate measures of KT performance (for example for the purpose to allocate 
third stream funding) becomes a complex problem too. It would be unwise to try and derive 
aggregate measures of performance when the units of measurement are not comparable, or when 
the measured activities are partly substitute or complementary with one another (Bonaccorsi and 
Daraio, 2008). Hence, there is a need for more flexibility also in the ways of aggregating 
performance indicators (Stirling, 2003; Grupp and Schubert., 2010). For example some authors 
are proposing the use of multidimensional measurements (van Vught and Ziegeleeds, 2012) and 
positioning indicators (Bonaccorsi and Daraio, 2008). Another way to introduce more flexibility 
and limit the biases implicit in formula funding could be to introduce, at least to some extent, 
competitive fund allocation mechanisms based on the relative merits of the various KT activities 
implemented by universities, measured on the basis of both quantitative and qualitative evidence. 
Since the system of KT performance indicators adopted in the UK is one of the most 
comprehensive, the general problems we have discussed are very likely to affect even more 
strongly other measurement systems that focus on a narrower range of activities (such as 
technology commercialization or spinoff activities, in the case of the surveys promoted by 
AUTM in the US and Canada, and by other associations of KT professionals in Europe and 
elsewhere). Furthermore, many countries in South Asia and Europe are considering the 
implementation of data collection exercises similar to the HE-BCI. Due to the increasing 
relevance of this issue, more theoretical and empirical research is needed into the criteria for the 
selection of appropriate KT indicators and into the best ways to aggregate them in order to 
compare the KT performance of different universities. 
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